Africa: Really bad at learning lessons from the past

Liberia was declared Ebola-free over the weekend, ending a 14-month nightmare that left 4,716 people dead, and over 10,000 infected by the virus. This stands as the deadliest Ebola outbreak in world’s history, and it threatened to bring Liberia back to its knees, just as the country was starting to gain some reconstruction momentum following a devastating 12-year civil war.

Her neighbours, Guinea and Sierra Leone are yet to bring their infections completely to a halt, though new infections are now in single digits (just nine new infections were reported in the week of May 3 according to quartz).

As Liberia breathes a sigh of relief, questions remain as to how well prepared Africa is for the next big outbreak, and, if any lessons have truly been learned; not just for the countries at the epicentre of the outbreak but for the rest of Africa. Looking at the historical trends, and news coming out of the continent over the past few weeks, it suggests that Africa doesn’t do a very good job of learning from the past events.

South Africa has been hit by a wave of xenophobic attacks in the past month, in which seven people have been killed and hundreds forced to flee their homes. The level of intolerance, suspicion, and utter hostility that many South Africans have against foreign, mainly African nationals mirrors the very same discrimination and prejudice that black South Africans suffered under the white racist apartheid regime.

It seems that the lessons that could have been learned from the oppression of apartheid, that would make South Africa a more inclusive, just and welcoming place in the spirit of Ubuntu, were not internalised at all.

In Central Africa, the same game is playing out in Burundi, which has lived through decades of resentment and full-blown war between the two major groups in the country, the Hutu and the Tutsi.

From History, the Tutsi held power, controlling the military, most of the civil service, the judicial system, and even higher education. A civil war was sparked off by the killing of president Melchior Ndadaye in 1993, killing 300,000 people. Under international pressure, the warring factions negotiated a peace agreement in Arusha in 2000, which called for an ethnically-balanced military and government and democratic elections.

Pierre Nkurunziza has officially launched his re-election bid this week, even as protesters insist it is an unconstitutional third term – at least 19 people have been killed in the No Third Term protests.

With Nkurunziza intent on hogging power, it is clear that the lessons of ethnic balancing and power-sharing fell on shallow soil.

In neighbouring Rwanda, Paul Kagame is under a different kind of pressure. Calls are mounting for the constitution to be amended to allow him to vie for a third term in 2017.

Just like in Burundi, the Tutsi historically held power and were favoured by the Belgian colonial authorities, but unlike in Burundi, Tutsis did not consolidate power after independence but were targeted in genocidal killings, persecuted and many forced to flee into exile when a “Hutu-Power” government came into power in 1962.

Supporters of the third term bid say, among other things, that Kagame has done such a sterling job in lifting the country from the atrocity of the 1994 genocide, in which an estimated 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed; that he should be allowed to continue to lead the country.

Kagame is said to be keeping his options open, and it remains to be seen if Rwanda has gleaned any enduring lessons on the exercise of power as an imperative for the Rwandan political situation, the excellence of any one individual leader notwithstanding.

In West Africa, Nigeria celebrated the election of Muhammadu Buhari in March, and outgoing president, Goodluck Jonathan was widely praised for not making a big fuss out of losing.

But Buhari will not be popping the celebratory champagne for long. Nigeria relies on oil for 70% of government financing, and Buhari will find that he is facing an economic situation that is in some ways, an unnerving echo of his administration, almost exactly 30 years ago (1983-1985).

With the nation’s coffers full to overflowing following the oil spike of 1973-1974, Nigeria spent most of its windfall on infrastructure projects but also, unwisely, began recklessly borrowing against anticipated future oil income. 

By the time Buhari took power in 1983 and oil prices began tumbling, Nigeria was unable to keep up on its debt payments, and the result was a severe downturn in the Nigerian economy, with the Gross Domestic Product contracting an astonishing 68.2% between 1980 and 1986.

Global oil prices have dropped nearly 50% in the past year, but Nigeria just might hold up better than the first time around.

Although Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala admitted that the country has already borrowed more than half the amount it budgeted for the full year as it struggles to deal with lower income from oil, improvements in agricultural output and a macroeconomic policy that has kept inflation below double figures is keeping the country above water.